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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

t

Petitioner-Appellant,

:

v•

:

RAYMOND JEFFREY JOHNSON,

:

Defendant-Respondent.

Case No. 20562

Priority No. 2

:

REPLY TO PETITION FOR REHEARING
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant petitioned this Court for rehearing of an
opinion filed by this Court on June 30, 1987.

In the opinion

authored by Justice Stewart, defendant's conviction of aggravated
robbery and aggravated assault was affirmed and his conviction of
theft was reversed.

Defendant was sentenced by the Honorable

Leonard H. Russon, Third District Court, in and for Salt Lake
County, to five years to life for the aggravated robbery, and
zero to five years for the aggravated assault.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts are set forth in the Brief of Respondent
(Respondents' Brief at 2-7) .
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court in its opinion clearly recognized and
addressed defendant's argument that insufficient evidence existed
to convict him of aggravated assault.

In finding tftat sutficient

evidence existed for the jury to conclude that defendant either

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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committed an aggravated assault or aided or abetted another in
the commission of the offense, this Court did not overlook any
material facts or principles of law*
Defendant has cited no new facts or law in his petition
for rehearing other than testimony by the victims which has
already been addressed by the State and this Court in its
opinion, and statements by the prosecutor which clearly was not
evidence in the case.
ARGUMENT

POINT J
THIS COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT
DEFENDANT EITHER COMMITTED OR AIDED OR
ABETTED ANOTHER IN THE COMMISSION OF AN
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT.
In his petition for rehearing defendant claims that he
was improperly convicted of aggravated assault because
insufficient evidence existed to show that he either directly
committed the offense or aided or abetted another in the
commission of the offense.

in Prcwn v» PicKarflf denying reh'qr 4 Utah 292, 11 p.
512 (1886), this Court set forth the standard for determining
whether a petition for rehearing should be granted:
To justify a rehearing, a strong case must be
made. We must be convinced that the court
failed to consider some material point in the
case, or that it erred in its conclusions, or
that some matter has been discovered which
was unknown at the time of the hearing.
4 Utah at 294, 11 P. at 512 (citation omitted).

In Cumminas v.

Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 129 P. 619 (1913), this Court stated:
To make an application for a rehearing is a
matter of right, and we have no desire to

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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discourage the practice of filing petitions
for rehearings in proper cases. When this
court, however, has considered and decided
all of the material questions involved in a
case, a rehearing should not be applied for,
unless we have misconstrued or overlooked
some material fact or facts, or have
overlooked some statute or decision which may
affect the result, or that we have based the
decision on some wrong principle of law, or
have either misapplied or overlooked
something which materially affects the
result. . . .
If there are some reasons,
however, such as we have indicated above, or
other good reasons, a petition for a
rehearing should be promptly filed and, if it
is meritorious, its form will in no case be
scrutinized by this court.
42 Utah at 172-73, 129 P. at 624.
In the opinion authored by Justice Stewart, State v.
Johnson. 60 Utah Adv. Rep. 30 (Utah, June 30, 1987), (Appendix A)
the Court attirmed defendant's conviction after a full and fair
consideration of defendant's arguments on appeal.

The Court

clearly recognized tnat defendant's contention that insufficient
evidence existed to convict him ot aggravated assault was without
merit.
Even assuming that there is no evidence that
Johnson personally committed the aggravated
assault, Johnson's argument is untenable . .
. . Since Johnson essentially concedes that
he had the intent to participate with the
others in the aggravated robbery, and since
there is sufficient evidence that Johnson was
one of the two men in the jewelry store at
the time of the robbery, Johnson was
responsible for the aggravated assault,
either as a principal or an aider and abetter
under [Utah Code Ann.] S 76-2-202. The
evidence shows that both men participated in
forcing the customer to the back bathroom and
that one ot the men used a gun. Under these
facts, the man who did not use a gun
nonetheless encouraged and aided the other to
commit the aggravated assault.
60 Utah Adv. Rep. at 32.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law-3Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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It is clear from a review of defendant's briet, his
petition for rehearingf and the Court's opinion, that defendant
does not meet the necessary requirements to grant a petition for
rehearing.

Under Cummings, this Court should grant a petition

for rehearing only if it finds that it overlooked or misconstrued
any material facts, statute or other principle of law applicable
in the case.
Defendant's petition for rehearing is substantially the
same argument he raised in his brief on appeal.

In his petition

for rehearing, defendant makes reference to two items in the
record not initially cited in his brief.

First, defendant cites

to testimony by the two victims that defendant was not in the
store.

This additional cite to the record provides nothing new

to his argument.

Acknowledging the testimony by the victims, the

State nonetheless argued in its responsive brief that three
witnesses outside of the store observed defendant and another man
leaving the jewelry store carrying a full plastic garbage bag and
entering a car which sped away as they entered (Br. of Resp. at
21-22, R. 1088, 1139, 1192).

Additionally, the State argued on

direct appeal that neither victim obtained a good look at the
perpetrator because of his demand that the victims not look at
his face (Br. ot Resp. at 22, R. 643, 1221).

Apparently this

Court adopted the State's argument since it found that "there is
sufficient evidence that Johnson was one of the two men in the
jewelry store at the time of the robbery. . . " Johnson 60 Utah
Adv. Rep. at 32.
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Second, defendant cites to the prosecutor's opening
statements describing the anticipated testimony of the victims as
evidence that neither victim recognized defendant as the
perpetrator.

It is well recognized that the purpose of an

opening statement is to outline the issues of the trial for the
jury and is not admissible evidence for the jury to consider.
State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365f

, 120 P.2d 285, 313 (1941).

Additionally, the prosecutor in the instant case told the jury
that statements by attorneys in the case were not evidence and
that the only evidence to be considered by the jury was that
which would be introduced during the trial in the form of
exhibits and testimony (R. 589, 1628).

Furthermore, it appears

from the prosecutor's statements that the Judge also advised the
jury tnat statements by attorneys were not to be considered as
evidence.
The Court has told you that what the
attorneys say in either asking the questions
ot the witnesses or in arguing the case to
you, or to the Court, is not evidence and
none of us attorneys expect you to accept
what we tell you as evidence.

You have heard the evidence. The Court has
instructed you to base your deliberations on
the evidence, and not on what I may say or
what any of the other lawyers may say, or not
on what you may have heard in connection with
other cases, or heard out of this courtroom
in connection with this case.
(R. 589, 1628).

Defendant has cited no new facts in the record

or principle of law overlooked by this Court.

All defendant has

done in his petition for rehearing is provide testimony by the
victims which was already addressed by the State and this Court
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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on direct appeal, and statements by the prosecutor which the jury
was informed not to consider as evidence in the case.

Just as

this Court pointed out in its opinion, even assuming that no
evidence exists that defendant personally committed the
aggravated assault, nonetheless he conceded that he had the
intent to participate with the others in the aggravated robbery
and thus was responsible for the aggravated assault either as a
principal or an aider and abetter.

It is clear from this Court's

opinion that it considered all material facts and principles of
law and found defendant's argument to be without merit.

Because

defendant cites no new facts in the record or principle of law
overlooked by this Court, the State requests this Court to deny
the petition for rehearing based upon the well-reasoned opinion
already rendered by this Court.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing arguments, defendant's
petition for rehearing should be denied and his conviction
affirmed.
DATED this

/^

day of November, 1987.
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

t!*j6«£ <=>?. ^y^^f
KIMBERLY K. HORNAK
Assistant Attorney General
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of rescission or of an tccord and satisfaction
of the entire Agreement was ever made and
accepted. The October, 1980 letters merely
disputed the time when the payments were to
be made and did not contain an offer or state
the purpose or intent of the early repayment.
The May 22, 1981 letter of transmittal
stated, 'Since the full repayment of this loan
is the final matter to be taken care of in
regard to the Gold-Spor Company matters
with Crested Butte, I have prepared and enclosed a Receipt and Release for signature by
Crested Butte.* That attempt to foreclose
Crested Butte from its rights under the contract was made only after the Spors had made
full payment on the loan. Indeed, the letter
began, "1 have been informed ... that the GoldSpor loan has now been paid in full/ This
after-the-fact, unilateral effort by the Spors
does not satisfy the requirements for either a
mutual rescission or an accord and satisfaction.
The wording of the 'receipt and release0
also supports Crested Butte's claim. Although
the 'receipt and release" contemplated a
complete rescission of the Agreement, the
•receipt and release,* as well as the letter of
transmittal which accompanied it, expressly
required the signature of Crested Butte before
the document could become effective. The
stated consideration for the 'receipt and
release* was the mutual release of the obligations created by the Agreement and not just
the prepayment of the loan. Repayment of the
loan was only one, independent obligation
created by the Agreement. Nowhere in the
'receipt and release' is prepayment of the loan
referred to as the final performance to be
rendered by either party pursuant to the Agreement. Thus, consistent with Crested Butte's
version of the facts, the sending of the
'receipt and release* may have simply been
the first offer of final settlement after the full
repayment of the loan.
Because disputed material factual issues
existed concerning the purpose of the early
repayment of the loan, the trial court inappropriately drew inferences as to the parties*
intent in deciding the issue on summary judgment. That may not be done in resolving a
motion for summary judgment. U'.M. BMJDCS
Co. v. Sohio NMturtl Resources Co., 627 P.2d
56,59 (Utah 1981).
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. Costs to appellants.
WE CONCUR:
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice
• Richard C. Howe, Justice
Christine M. Durham, Justice
• Leonard H. Ruison, District Judge
Zimmerman, Justice, having
disqualified himself, does not participate
herein, Russon, District Judge, sat.

1. 'The Sport* means the individual and corporate
plaintiffs combined or in separate capacities, but
does not represent Cold Spor Mining Company.

Otr as
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE of Utah,
Plaintiff and Respondeat,
Raymond Jeffrey JOHNSON,
Defendant and Appellant.
No. 20562
FILED: Jane 30,1W7
THIRD DISTRICT
Leonard H. Russon
ATTORNEYS:
David L. Wilkinson, KimbeTly JC. Hornak,
Salt Lake City, for Respondent
Joseph C. Fratto, Jr., Salt Lake City, for
Appellant
STEWART, Associate Chief Jnstke:
Defendant Johnson was convicted of aggravated robbery, aggravated assault, and theft.
Johnson appeals, seeking reversal of his conviction and a new trial. Four issues are presented on appeal: (1) whether the search of
Johnson's automobile went beyond the constitutional scope of an inventory search, (2)
whether there was sufficient evidence with
which to convict Johnson of aggravated
assault, (3) whether a jury instruction regarding the possession of stolen property unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proof to
Johnson, and (4) whether, under the circumstances of this case, theft is a lesser included
offense of aggravated robbery. We affirm in
part and reverse the theft conviction.
The evidence, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the jury veTdict, shows that on
August 18, 1984, Johnson and a male accomplice entered Oak wood Jewelry in Salt Lake
County. The first to enter forced the lone sales
derk at gun point into a bathroom in the back
of the store. While one of the men was collecting jewelry, a female customer entered the
store. The customer was forced to the rear of
the store by one man, and the other man
forced her at gun point into the bathroom
with the sales clerk. The sales derk and the
customer were repeatedly told not to look at
the face of either Johnson or his accomplice.
Shortly thereafter witnesses observed Johnson
and another man outside Oak wood Jewelers

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated
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60 UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
walking very quickly and carrying a large
garbage bag with imall object* bulging from
the bag. Johnson was positively identified by
these witnesses at trial. Moreover, the witnesses testified that another man and a woman
were waiting in an automobile which had the
enfine running, the man in the driver's seat
and the woman in the front passenger seat,
and that Johnson and his accomplice hurriedly
got into the back seat and the car sped away.
Johnson's automobile was identified as the
automobile in which the individuals left.
On August 24, 1984, two officers from the
Los Angeles Police Department on routine
patrol at the Pink Motel in Los Angeles observed Johnson in his automobile in the
parking lot operating illegal hydraulic lifts.
The officers also observed a woman, Jeanna
Salaznr, walk out of Room 10 of the Pink
Motel and get into the automobile with
Johnson. Salaiar appeared to be under the
influence of an opiate. The officers also observed two other individuals, Johnson's
brother and his girlfriend, in Room 10 administering drugs to themselves.
Soon after Salazar got into the car with
Johnson, the two started to leave. Johnson's
brother and bis girlfriend approached the car
at about the same time that the police officers
stopped the car and observed marijuana inside
in plain view. They also observed track marks
on the insides of the individuals' arms and
placed all four under arrest for being under
the influence of a controlled substance.
A .38 caliber revolver and a substantial
amount of jewelry were recovered from Room
10 of the Pink Motel. The officers also found
jewelry on the suspects and .38 caliber ammunition in the purse of one of the suspects.
Johnson's car was impounded and an inventory search was conducted in compliance with
the Los Angeles Police Department automobile inventory checklist. Under the hood, the
officers found jewelry wrapped in a Pink
Motel towel, and in the trunk, they found a
small unlocked box labeled 'Oakwood Jewelry
Inc., Salt Lake City.' An officer opened the
box and found over one thousand precious
gems. The jewelry waj subsequently identified
as the jewelry taken from Oak wood Jewelers.
I.
The fust issue is whether the search of
defendant's automobile went beyond the legitimate scope of an inventory search. An inventory search of an automobile is a welldefined exception to the warrant requirement
of the Fourth Amendment. See South Dskou
r. Oppernum. 428 U.S. 364, 367-76(1976); Sute
r. Cole, 674 P.2d 119, 126 (Utah 1983).
In Oppermsn, three purposes of an inventory
•earch were outlined: (1) to protect an owner's
property while it is in the custody of police;
(2) to insure against claims of lost, stolen, or
vandalized property; and (3) to protect police

31

officers from danger. Oppcrmao, 428 U.S. at
369.
Johnson contends that the search of bis car
was not a true inventory search but wis an
investigatory search because the officers'
detail was only a burglary detail and because
they were not really concerned with Johnson's
using hydraulic lifts. He relies on United
Ststes v. HcUmtn, 556 F.2d 442, 443-44 (9th
Cir. 1977), which held that impounding •
vehicle for the purpose of a warrantless search
and not for a legitimate inventory violates the
Fourth Amendment.
The impoundment and subsequent inventory
search of Johnson's car were conducted after
Johnson and his friends were lawfully arrested
for being under the influence of a controlled
substance. Clearly, the officers were not required to ignore drug-related violations simply
because they were on a burglary detail.
Johnson also contends that the inventory
search was investigatory because the police
made no determination whether the automobile could remain in the rootd driveway or
parking lot while Johnson was being booked.
The argument is not persuasive. Colorado r.
Bcrtine, 107 S. Ct. 738 (1987), held that although the police could have offered the defendant the opportunity to make other arrangements for the safekeeping of his property,
their failure to do so did not eliminate the
justification for taking an inventory of the
defendant's property. In Bertioe, the defendant's van was impounded by police after the
arrest. A back-up police officer inventoried
the defendant's van in accordance with local
police procedures. The officer found a backpack behind the front seat and, inside the
pack, a nylon bag containing metal canisters.
The officer opened the canisters and discovered that they contained cocaine, methaqu*lone tablets, cocaine paraphernalia, and $700
in cash. The officer further found $210 in a
sealed envelope inside the backpack. Id. at
740. The Court held that even though givinj
the defendant an 'opportunity to make alternative arrangements would undoubtedly have
been possible ... 'the real question is not what
could have been achieved but whether the
Fourth Amendment requires such steps." Id.
at 742 (quoting Illinois v. La/ayettr, 462 U.S.
640, 647 (J983)) (emphasis in Lafayette). The
interest the police had in protecting themselves
and the lot owners against false claims of theft
was sufficient under the Fourth Amendment
to justify taking an inventory of the contents
of the backpack. The same justifications apply
to the facts of this case.
Furthermore, the existence or absence of
justification for the impoundment of an automobile may be determined from the surrounding drcumsunces. Sute v. Rice, 717 P.2d
695, 696 (Utah 1986); Sute r. Hygh, 711 P.2d
264, 268 (Utah 1985). At the time of the
arrests, Johnson's car was parked in the
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middle of a motel parking lot, blocking
traffic. The car had art out-of-town temporary sticker in lieu of license plates. Johnson
did not have a driver's license, and his friends
were under the influence of a controlled substance and were under arrest; neither Johnson
nor his friends could properly have moved the
vehicle.
Johnson next asserts that the police officers
were unjustified in inventorying under the
hood and in the locked trunk. In Berune, the
Court stated that 'reasonable police regulations relating to inventory procedures administered in good faith satisfy the Fourth Amendment.* 107 S. Ct. at 742. In addition, the
Court wrote, "When a legitimate search is
under way, and when its purpose and its limits
have been precisely defined, nice distinctions
between ... glove compartments, upholstered
seats, trunks, and wrapped packages ... must
give way to the interest in the prompt and
efficient completion of the task at hand." Id.
at 743 (quoting United Sutes v. Ross, 456
U.S. 798,821 (1982)).
The search in this case was conducted according to an inventory checklist mandated by
the Los Angeles Police Department for ail
impounded vehicles. The areas in the trunk
and under the hood are included on an inventory check list so that vaJuable items that
may be in the trunk or under the hood are
accounted for and so that the condition of
items such as the spare tire, the battery, and
other equipment can be determined. There is
DO showing that the Los Angeles police officers acted in bad faith by conducting an inventory search as a pretense for conducting an
illegal warrantless search. See Hygh, 711 P.2d
264. The officers were justified in searching
the trunk, its contents, and under the hood
and in opening the unlocked jewelry box
found in the trunk and unwrapping the towel
found under the hood. Berune, 107 S. Ct. at
743; OppcnnMn, 428 U.S. at 364; Sute v.
Ear/. 716 P.2d 803 (Utah 1986).
Finally, Johnson contends that since the
police did not know the jewelry was connected
with a robbery in Salt Lake City, the seizure J
of the jewelry and the subsequent investigation
to determine whether it was stolen were unlawful. The point is without merit. The large
amount of jewelry, some located under the
bood wrapped in a towel, some found in a
box labeled * Oak wood Jewelers. Inc., Salt
Lake City/ and some found in Room 10 of
the Pink Motel, was sufficient to give rise to a
strong belief that the jewels were stolen. Since
the jewels were in the lawful custody of the
police, DO warrant was necessary.

challenge, however, his conviction for aggravated robbery of the jewelry store. His contention is only that it was one of the other
participants in the robbery who committed the
aggravated assault. He argues that despite his
conviction of aggravated robbery, be did not
have the specific intent to commit an aggravated assault and, therefore, this conviction was
in error.
Even assuming that there is no evidence that
Johnson personally committed the aggravated
assault, Johnson's argument is untenable.
Utah Code Ann. f 76*2-202 (1978) provides as follows:
Every person, acting with the
mental state required for the commission of an offense who directly
commits the offense, who solicits,
requests, commands, encourages, or
intentionally aids another person to
engage in conduct which constitutes
an offense shall be criminally liable
as a party for such conduct.
Since Johnson essentially concedes that he had
the intent to participate with the others in the
aggravated robbery, and since there is sufficient evidence that Johnson was one of the two
men in the jewelry store at the time of the
robbery, Johnson was responsible for the
aggravated assault, either as a principal or an
aider and abetter under ( 76-2-202. The
evidence shows that both men participated in
forcing the customer to the back bathroom
and that one of the men used a gun. Under
these facts, the man who did not use a gun
nonetheless encouraged and aided the other to
commit the aggravated assault.

m.

The third issue is whether a jury instruction
regarding the possession of stolen property
unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proof
to Johnson. See StMte v. TMTMTM, 720 P.2d
1368 (Utah 1986); Sute v. pMcheco, 712 P.2d
192 (Utah 1985); StMte v. Chambers, 709 P.2d
321 (Utah 1985). Section 76-6-402(1) (1978)
sutes: 'Possession of property recently stolen,
when no satisfactory explanation of such
possession is made, shall be deemed prima
facie evidence that the person in possession
stole the property/ If the trial court had instructed in the language of the statute, it would
have encd. Frtntis v. FrinkUn, 471 U.S. 307
(1985); StMte v. Chambers, aupra. But the
court did not so instruct. Rather, the trial
court instructed the jury as follows: 'Under
the law of the Sute of Utah, possession of
property recently stolen, when a person in
possession fails to make a satisfactory explanation of such possession, is a fact from
n.
which you may infer that the person in possJohnson next claims that there was insuffi- ession stole such property.* This instruction
cient evidence to convict him of an aggravated was not defective. Sute v. Smith, 726 P.2d
assault on the customer who was in Oakwood 1232 (Utah 1986).
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Johnson also contends that the instruction
failed to correctly state the presumption articutated in | 76-6-402(1) and that the use
of the word "fails* instead of the statutory
language # no* misdirected the jury. The argument is frivolous, as is the contention that
the term *may infer* is stronger than the statutory language of a presumption which would
be 'deemed prima facie.*
IV.
Finally, Johnson contends that his conviction for theft should be reversed because,
under the facts of this case, theft was a lesser
included offense of the aggravated robbery
charge. On this point, defendant is correct.
Sure v. Hill, 674 P.2d 96 (Utah 1983). squarely holds that to be the law.
The convictions are affirmed except for the
theft conviction, which is reversed.

Id. 272 n.l (citations omitted). Were this case
argued as state constitutional grounds, I might
well find the search unlawful.
1 join the majority in rejecting the remainder of the defendant's contentions. The
conviction is appropriately affirmed.
Durham, Justice, concurs in the
concurring opinion of Justice Zimroerraaa.
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IN T H E SUPREME COURT
OF T H E STATE OF U T A H
STATE of Utah.
Plaintiff aad Respondeat,

WE CONCUR:
Cordon R. Hall, Chief Justice
Richard C. Howe, Justice

Daoay RICHARDS,
Defeadaat aad Appetiaat.

Zim»eraaa, Jastke: (Coacvrrlng)

No. 20510
FILED: Urn* 30, 19S7

I join the majority in concluding that under
relevant United States Supreme Court decisions, the inventory search conducted here was
permissible.
However, I would specifically note that the
defendant has not challenged this search under
article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution.
As I noted in my separate opinion in State v.
Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 271-72 (Utah 1985)
(Zimmerman, J., concurring), much of the
existing federal fourth amendment warrantless
search and seizure law is rather Kafkaesque,
consisting as it does of
rules built upon a series of contradictory and confusing rationalizations and distinctions. Police officers
and judges attempting to make their
way through this labyrinth often
imperil both the rights of individuals and the integrity in effectiveness of law enforcement.
Id. at 272. Nothing has occurred within the
almost two years since Hygh to dissuade n e
from this view. And I include within the sweep
of this condemnation the rules governing
warrantless automobile searches, such as occurred in the present case. The notion that
anything on wheels can be searched by an
officer who, after the fact, can offer some
reasonable justification for having done so
essentially guts the fourth amendment's warrant requirement as it
pertains to automobile searches.
There is tittle reason to believe that
effective law enforcement requires
this sacrifice of interests protected
by the warrant requirement.
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ATTORNEYS:
David L. Wilkinson, Dave B. Thompson, Salt
Lake City, for Respondent
Karen Jennings, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
STEWART, Associate Chief Jastke:
Danny Richards appeals a judgment entered
against him for assault, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. { 765-102 (1978). The trial court sentenced Richards to the maximum term of six months in
the Salt Lake County jail and refused to give
him credit for seventy-five days of presentence incarceration he served because of his
inability to post bail. The issue he raises is
whether he was denied equal protection of the
law by the trial court's refusal to credit his
sentence with his presentence incarceration
time.
On December 15, 1984, Richards was arrested and charged with aggravated assault, a
third degree felony. Utah Code Ann. | 76-5103 (1978). Although his motion to reduce bail
was granted, he was still unable to post bail,
and he remained in jail from the date of his
arrest until his sentencing. On February 28,
1985, Richards pleaded guilty to simple
assault. Eight days later, on March 8, 1985, he
was sentenced to the maximum jail term
allowed and ordered to make restitution. After
sentencing, Richards asked the trial court to
credit his presentence incarceration time
against his six-month term. The trial judge
granted credit for the eight days between the
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